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ARISTOTLE AND LYNDON BAINES
JOHNSON: THIRTEEN WAYS OF
LOOKING AT BLACKBIRDS AND
NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS - THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT
CORPORATION ACT
Michael C. Hone*
I. ESSENCES AND POLITICAL REALITY
OVER TWO THOUSAND years ago Aristotle searched for the
essence of truth. He believed that the essence of truth was the
convergence of mind and reality.' He believed in the existence of
objective truths which could be realized and appreciated. Since
that time, man has searched for the nature and essence of many
things. He has tried to determine the nature of justice,2 beauty,'
war," desire,5 mind,6 and a myriad of other concepts.
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco; Reporter, California Nonprofit
Corporation Act; Reporter, American Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit Corpora-
tion Act.
1. ARISTOTLE, Categories, in BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 35 (R. McKeon trans.
1941).
2. O'Rorke v. Bolingbroke, 2 App. Cas. 814, 834 (1877). Lord Blackburn stated that
"it is of the essence of justice not to decide against any one on grounds which are not
charged against him, and as to which he has not had an opportunity of offering explana-
tions or calling evidence." Id. at 834.
3. PLATO, Symposium, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 301, 334-35 (B. Jowett trans.
1937). "And the true order of going, or being lead by another, to the things of love, is to
begin from the beauties of earth and mount upwards for the sake of that other beauty,
using these as steps only, and from one going on to two, and from two to all fair forms,
from fair forms to fair practices, and from fair practices to fair notions, until from fair
notions he arrives at the notion of absolute beauty, and at last knows what the essence of
beauty is." Id. at 335.
4. LORD NUGENT, MEMORIALS OF JOHN HAMPDEN (4th ed. 1860).
5. ARISTOTLE, Politics, in BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note I, at 1127, 1158-
61. "But want is not the sole incentive to crime; men also wish to enjoy themselves and not
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In the modern era, academics and jurists have sought a gen-
eral theory explaining the existence of nonprofit corporations.'
They are following the path first trod by Aristotle. They are
searching for the universal essence of nonprofit corporations. Once
satisfied that they have discovered this elusive quality, they have
derived a system of legal categories and legal conclusions reflect-
ing the proper treatment of nonprofit corporations.8 In this man-
ner, the law of nonprofit corporations has been explained in terms
of legal, 9 economic, 10 tax," and political' 2 theories.
As a legislator, Lyndon Baines Johnson was also interested in
the laws governing nonprofit corporations. However, Johnson was
to be in a state of desire - they wish to cure some desire, going beyond the necessities of
life, which preys upon them; nay, this is not the only reason - they may desire superflu-
ities in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with pain, and thereafter they commit
crimes." Id. at 1159.
6. LUCRETIUS, ON THE NATURE OF THINGS 133 (C. Bailey trans. 1910). "Death,
then, is but naught to us, nor does it concern us a whit, inasmuch as the nature of the mind
is but a mortal possession." Id.
7. See, e.g., Ben-Ner, Nonprofit Organizations: Why Do They Exist in Market
Economies?, in THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 94, 94-95 (S. Rose-Acker-
man ed. 1986); Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 1416, 1418 (1980); Ellman, Another Theory of Nonprofit Corporations, 80 MICH. L.
REV. 999, 999 (1982); Hansmann, The Role of the Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J.
835, 837-43 (1980); James, The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 397, 397 (W. Powell ed. 1987); Krashinsky,
Transaction Costs and a Theory of the Nonprofit Organization, in THE ECONOMICS OF
NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS, supra, at 114, 114-15; Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Vol-
untary Nonprofit Sector in a Three Sector Economy, in THE VOLUNTARY NONPROFIT
SECTOR 51, 51-52 (B. Weisbrod ed. 1977).
8. For example, in the late 1970s Henry Hansmann, now a professor at Yale, pro-
posed an economic analysis of nonprofit corporations. He described nonprofit corporations
as resulting in large part from market failure and emphasized their role in providing "pub-
lic goods." He proceeded to divide nonprofit corporations into four categories: mutual dona-
tive, mutual commercial, entrepreneurial donative, and entrepreneurial commercial. He
then reached various conclusions as to how nonprofit corporations should be treated based
upon these categories. See Hansmann, supra note 7, at 837-43.
9. See. e.g., Clark, supra note 7, at 1418; Ellman, supra note 7, at 99; Hansmann,
Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 504-08 (1981).
10. See, e.g., Ben-Ner, supra note 7, at 94-95; Hansmann, Economic Theories of
Nonprofit Organization, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note
7, at 27, 29-33; James, supra note 7, at 397; Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The
Scope and Theory of Government- Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 99, 99-100; Weisbrod, supra note 7, at 94.
11. See, e.g., Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from
Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 357-58 (1976); Hansmann, The Rationale
for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE LJ.
54, 55 (1981).
12. See, e.g., Douglas, Political Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE NON-
PROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 7, at 43.
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not as interested in discovering the essence of nonprofits as Aris-
totle was in discovering the essence of truth. As a politician, John-
son's primary goal in life was being elected to office. In one sense,
it was the essence of his life."3 When the concerns of Johnson the
legislator clashed with those of Johnson the politician, it was the
latter that prevailed.
Johnson believed that a private Texas foundation had finan-
cially supported his opponent in a tough election. 4 After he was
elected, Johnson proposed an amendment to the bill which eventu-
ally became the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.11 That amend-
ment provided that 501(c)(3) organizations may "not participate
in, or intervene in ...any political campaign on behalf of any
candidate for public office.""
There is no record of the debate, if any, surrounding the pas-
sage of that amendment. The logical argument favoring such an
amendment is that those corporations qualifying for the section
501(c)(3) tax subsidy should not be permitted to directly or indi-
.rectly use that subsidy to support candidates for office. 17 However,
it is unlikely that Johnson was motivated to propose the amend-
ment because of logic or his understanding of the nature of
501(c)(3) organizations. It is much more likely that Johnson was
motivated by a desire to exact revenge on the foundation he be-
lieved supported his opponent and to prevent it and other non-
profit corporations from acting similarly in the future. This politi-
cal decision has significantly affected a large number of nonprofit
corporations."8
II. BLACKBIRDS, PLURALISM, AND MODEL LAWS
Which approach is more helpful, insightful, and useful
that of Aristotle or that of Lyndon Baines Johnson? The answer is
13. See generally R. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON (1982)(arguing that
Johnson was driven by his ambition to run for political office).
14. B. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 281 (5th ed. 1987).
15. Id.
16. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986).
17. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
18. In 1985 there were 366,071 section 501(c)(3) organizations according to Internal
Revenue Service records. B. HOPKINS, supra note 14, at 22.
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found in the poem "Thirteen Ways of Looking At A Blackbird." 19
19. THIRTEEN WAYS OF LOOKING AT A BLACKBIRD
I
Among twenty snowy mountains,
The only moving thing
Was the eye of the blackbird.
II
I was of three minds,
Like a tree
In which there are three blackbirds.
III
The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds.
It was a small part of the pantomime.
IV
A man and a woman
Are one.
A man and a woman and a blackbird
Are one.
V
I do not know which to prefer,
The beauty of inflections
Or the beauty of innuendoes,
The blackbird whistling
Or just after.
VI
Icicles filled the long window
. With barbaric glass.
The shadow of the blackbird
Crossed it, to and fro.
The mood
Traced in the shadow
An indecipherable cause.
VII
O thin men of Haddam,
Why do you imagine golden birds?
Do you not see how the blackbird
Walks around the feet
Of the women about you?
VIII
I know noble accents
And lucid, inescapable rhythms;
But I know, too,
That the blackbird is involved
In what I know.
IX
When the blackbird flew out of sight,
It marked the edge
Of one of many circles.
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The poem was written by Wallace Stevens, 20 and it suggests
that there is not one way, but numerous ways of looking at a
blackbird. A multiplicity of factors affect one's perception of the
blackbird. They include the changing colors, time of day, weather,
the observer's background, values, and emotional state.
Neither blackbirds nor nonprofit corporations have one objec-
tive essence. Some nonprofit corporations aid the needy,21 others
act as educational institutions22 or museums.28 More recently,
nonprofit organizations have championed environmental causes24
and brought public interest lawsuits. 25 Some nonprofit organiza-
tions operate as membership department stores, 26 do research for
the United States Air Force,21 or provide social28 or athletic facili-
x
At the sight of blackbirds
Flying in a green light,
Even the bawds of euphony
Would call out sharply.
XI
He rode over Connecticut
In a glass coach.
One, a fear pierced him,
In that he mistook
The shadow of his equipage
For blackbirds.
XII
The river is moving.
The blackbird must be flying.
XIII
It was evening all afternoon.
It was snowing
And it was going to snow.
The blackbird sat
In the cedar-limbs.
Wallace Stevens
THE COLLECTED POEMS OF WALLACE STEVENS 92 (A. Knopf ed. 1961).
20. Mr. Stevens was a graduate of New York Law School, a member of the Bar, an
insurance executive, and a distinguished poet. More interestingly, he turned down the posi-
tion of Lecturer at Harvard College to continue his career as a poet and insurance execu-
tive, stating that "such a move would precipitate the retirement that I want so much to put
off." 54 DICTIONARY OF LITERARY BIOGRAPHY 500 (Gale Research Co. 1987).
21. E.g., The American Red Cross.
22. E.g., Leland Stanford Junior University.
23. E.g., The Metropolitan Museum of Art.
24. E.g., The Sierra Club.
25. E.g., Public Advocates.
26. E.g., Fedco; this California nonprofit has over $200,000,000 in sales.
27. E.g., The Aerospace Corporation; this California nonprofit has over $50,000,000
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ties2" for members. Others minister to their members' spiritual
needs."0
Nonprofit organizations are as diverse as people's perceptions
of them. Lawyers, economists, sociologists, foundation executives,
grant recipients, the tax authorities, directors, members, state at-
torney generals, and others all may have different ways of viewing
and categorizing nonprofit organizations. The perception of each
may be different and contradictory in one sense, yet useful and
subjectively accurate in providing new and different insights into
nonprofit corporations. Their perceptions are useful as long as
they are recognized for what they are: value-laden observations
built upon any number of explicit and implicit assumptions.
How can a model law of nonprofit corporations be written in
a manner consistent with the Wallace Stevens poem? The answer
is that a model law must draw upon as many perspectives of non-
profit organizations as possible. A model law must recognize that
there exist innumerable ways of perceiving nonprofit corporations.
As a law represents a series of policy decisions, it is particularly
important to consider the various conflicting values which underlie
the law. As Stevens' poem indicates, there is more than one es-
sence to a person, organization, or concept. This is particularly
true for nonprofit organizations in the United States. A law should
not subjectively define the essence of an object or idea and then
base all of its conclusions on that essence. Rather, it must ac-
comodate a series of practical and conceptual concerns.
The United States has numerous and diverse voluntary non-
profit organizations. They appeal to, are based upon, and promote
different perceptions and values. Similarly, a law should recognize
and promote this diversity. In a pluralistic society it is dangerous
to use a single economic or philosophical theory to explain, vali-
date, or exclude organizations from a role in the nonprofit sector.
Academics, politicians, and writers of model laws should be par-
ticularly careful in this regard. When given a choice between vali-
dation or exclusion, they should choose exclusion only if there is a
compelling reason to do so.
in contracts with the United States Air Force.
28. E.g., The Bohemian Club.
29. E.g., The New York Athletic Club.
30. E.g., The First Church of Christ Scientist.
[Vol. 39:751
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III. DRAFTING PROCESS: THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT
A. Role of Model Law
A model nonprofit law has limited functions: it does not deal
with taxation,31 antitrust,32 or labor3 3 laws; nor does it deal with
numerous constitutional 4 and other issues. Its role is circum-
scribed by history and tradition.
A model nonprofit law does, however, play an important role
in facilitating nonprofit activities. A nonprofit law must provide:
1) an easy and inexpensive method of organizing nonprofit corpo-
rations,35 2) flexibility in corporate operation consistent with socie-
tal norms, 6 3) easily understood and fair methods of effecting
structural changes in 7 and dissolving 38 nonprofit corporations, and
4) protection for the public39 and those participating40 in the non-
31. See I.R.C. § 170 (tax deductions for charitable contributions); § 274 (disallow-
ance of certain entertainment expenses including charitable sporting events); § 403(b)
(treatment of annuity contracts for charitable organizations); § 501 (general requirements
for income tax exemption); § 502 (feeder organizations); § 503 (transactions resulting in
denial of tax exemption); § 508 (special rules for 501(c)(3) organizations); § 509 (defini-
tion of private foundations); § 511 (tax on unrelated business income); § 512 (definition of
unrelated business income); § 513 (definition of unrelated trade or business); and §§ 4941-
4947 (certain rules for private foundations).
32. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)(NCAA's plan to broadcast
certain collegiate football games violates § I of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act).,
33. See 12 U.S.C. § 1715(c) (1986); 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1986); see also NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979)(schools operated by religious organiza-
tion not subject to National Labor Relations Act); NLRB v. Salvation Army, 763 F.2d I
(1st Cir. 1985)(day care center operated by religious organization subject to Natonal La-
bor Relations Act).
34. See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(defi-
nition of "educational" contained in treasury regulation granting tax-exempt status to edu-
cational and charitable organizations unconstitutionally vague).
35. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 2-4 (1987)(sections dealing
with organization, purposes and powers, and names).
36. See id. § 1.60 (judicial relief); § 6.40 (delegates); § 7.05 (notice of meetings); §
7.06 (waiver of notice); § 7.07 (record date for determining members entitled to notice and
vote); § 7.08 (action by written ballot); and § 8.01 (requirement for and duties of board).
37. Id. §§ 10-12 (sections dealing with amendment of articles, mergers, and sale of
assets).
38. Id. § 14 (dissolution).
39. Id § 1.70 (Attorney General); § 3.04 (ultra vires); § 2.02(a)(3) (requiring an
initial registered agent for service of process to be named in the original articles of incorpo-
ration); § 2.04 (liability for preincorporation transactions); § 6.14 (creditor's action against
member); § 16.22 (annual report for Secretary of State). See also id. § 5 (office and agent)
and § 6 (foreign corporations).
40. Id. § 2.04 (liability for pre-incorporation transactions); § 6.12 (member's liability
to third parties); § 6.3 (member's liability for dues, assessments, and fees); § 6.20 (resigna-
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profit corporation consistent with the scope of model laws.
B. Nonprofit Laws - A Legal Hodgepodge
In 1977, I was asked to draft an entirely new nonprofit corpo-
ration law for the state of California."1 That law became effective
on January 1, 1980,42 and has since served as a beta site for the
American Bar Association's Revised Model Nonprofit Act. This
task gave me the opportunity to review the existing nonprofit cor-
poration laws in the various states. They were and still are an in-
consistent hodgepodge. Some states have a general nonprofit law
applicable to all nonprofit corporations;4 others, most notably
Delaware, do not.44 Many states have statutes applicable to reli-
gious corporations45 or to particular religions. 46 Some nonprofit
tion); § 6.21 (termination, expulsion, and suspension); § 6.30 (derivative suits); § 8.30
(general standards for directors); § 8.31 (director conflict of interest); and §§ 8.50-.58
(dealing with indemnification).
41. For a more detailed account of the drafting of the California Nonprofit Corpora-
tion Law, see Hone, California's New Nonprofit Corporation Law - An Introduction and
Conceptual Background, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 733, 734-36 (1979).
42. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 5000-5913 (West Supp. 1988).
43. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-20 to -29 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-416 to -
526 (West 1987); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-11-1 to -33 (1973), repealed by 1987 Miss.
LAWS 485; TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-1.01 to -11.01 (Vernon 1980); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 24.03.005- .935 (1969).
44. Delaware's General Corporation Law is applicable to business corporations and
nonprofit corporations. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 201-398 (1983). A few of its provisions
make particular reference to nonstock corporations or corporations with members. Id. §§
141(i) & 228(b).
45. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-264a to -2641 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 27, §§ 101-113 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 901-916 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
para. 154-188.3 (Smith-Hurd 1970); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. 67-68A (West 1988);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1471-1571 (1984).
46. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-268 to -282a (West 1987)(sections deal-
ing with nonprofit corporations made applicable to the Protestant Espiscopal Church,
Methodist Church, Augustana Evangelical Lutheran Church, Lutheran Church in
America, Roman Catholic Church, and The United Methodist Church); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 27, §§ 114-118 (1975)(sections dealing with nonprofit corporations made applicable to
the Protestant Episcopal Church and the Roman Catholic Church); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 67, §§ 39-46 & 55 (West 1988)(sections dealing with nonprofit corporations
made applicable to the Protestant Episcopal Church, Reformed Episcopal Church, United
Methodist Church, African Methodist Episcopal Church, Roman Catholic Church, and
various Orthodox Churches); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 458.1- .408 (West 1988)(stat-
utes dealing with nonprofit corporation law made applicable to the Roman Catholic
Church, Methodist Episcopal Church, Wesleyan Methodist Church, Methodist Protestant
Church, Free Methodist Church, Baptist Church, Baptist Convention, United Presbyterian
Church, Protestant Episcopal Church, Congregational Church, Reformed Protestant Dutch
Church, Christian Reformed Church, Evangelical Church, and the United Missionary
Church); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 315.17- .20 (West 1988)(sections dealing with the Protes-
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statutes prohibit indirect economic benefits from flowing to mem-
bers and controlling persons.47 Other laws allow indirect benefit,
but prohibit direct benefit.48 Some states follow the ABA's Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act,49 but others do not.50 New York has
categories of nonprofit organizations;51 most states do not.52 The
old California law contained twelve pages of provisions specifically
applicable to nonprofit corporations, but otherwise incorporated
the business law except "as to matters otherwise specifically pro-
vided for" in the skeletal nonprofit law.53
These nonprofit laws are the poor stepchild of the state busi-
ness statutes. Legislators have paid little attention to the struc-
ture, activities, needs, and role of nonprofit corporations. Scholars,
too, have devoted relatively little time and effort to the study and
analysis of nonprofit statutes. The body of statutory and case law
applicable to nonprofit corporations remains sparse and
undeveloped.
C. Input from the Field - Providing Practical Solutions
Empirical analysis, not simply deductive reasoning, is essen-
tial in drafting an effective law. Concurrent with my review of
nonprofit laws, but before I began to draft, I spent several months
contacting nonprofit organizations and associations to ask a simple
tant Episcopal Church).
Some states have separate provisions for corporations sole. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE
§§ 10000-10015 (West Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 24.12.01- .40 (West
1969).
In the nineteenth century some state constitutions prohibited the incorporation of
churches. Article 13, § 5 of the Missouri Constitution of 1820 provided that "no religious
corporation can ever be established in this state." MO. CONST. of 1820 art. 13, § 5. Article
6, § 47 of the West Virginia Constitution provides: "No charter of incorporation shall be
granted to any church or religious denomination .... " W. VA. CONsT. art. 6, § 47.
47. Note, Nonprofit Corporations - Definition, 17 VAND. L. REV. 336, 337-40
(1963)(discussion of the economic relationship between a nonprofit and its membership).
48. Id.
49. ALA. CODE §§ 10-3A-1 to -225 (1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-501 to -599.13
(1981); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 415B-1 to -159 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 273.161-
.390 (Baldwin 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-801 to -940 (1985).
50. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, §§ 1-29 (West 1987); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT
CORP. LAW §§ 101-1411 (McKinney 1970); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-1.10 to -
11.01 (Vernon 1980).
51. N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 201 (McKinney 1970).
52. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 163A-188.3 (Smith-Hurd 1970); Miss. CODE ANN.
§§ 79-1i-I to -33 (1973), repealed by 1987 Miss. LAWS 485; TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
art. 1396-1.01 to -11.01 (Vernon 1980).
53. CAL CORP. CODE § 9002 (West 1977).
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question: What problems are you having and what can be done to
help solve these problems? This process continued throughout the
drafting process of the California law and the Revised Act. More
than one thousand copies of an Exposure Draft of the Revised Act
were sent to nonprofit organizations, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, academics, accountants, and others for their comments.5
The input received from nonprofit organizations was crucial in
shaping the law.
Drafts of the Revised Act were evaluated over an eight year
period by the Subcommittee on the Model Nonprofit Corporation
Law of the Business Law Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion.55 Early in the process, the Subcommittee decided that the
Revised Act should address the everyday problems facing non-
profit organizations. The object was to provide practical answers
to these problems that were consistent with generally perceived
concepts of fairness. Each problem and proposed solution was con-
sidered in light 6f its effect on nonprofit organizations, their mem-
bers, and the public.
D. Holding Nonprofit Corporations' Feet to the Fire
There was a general consensus among members of the Sub-
committee that nonprofit corporations should be required to act in
a manner consistent with their representations to the general pub-
lic. A large number of nonprofit organizations hold themselves out
as operating for a public or charitable purpose. These groups
came to be known as public benefit corporations. 56 The American
Red Cross, the Museum of Modern Art, and Case Western Re-
serve University are examples of public benefit corporations.
Other nonprofit corporations hold themselves out as operating
for the mutual benefit of their members. These organizations
came be known as mutual benefit corporations.5 7 Trade associa-
tions, such as the California Wine Institute, and clubs, such as the
Harvard Club in New York, are examples of mutual benefit
corporations.
There was a long battle over the question of how churches
and other religious organizations should be treated. Some thought
they were public benefit organizations. The Subcommittee initially
54. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT xix (1987).
55. Id.
56. Id. at xxiv-xxviii.
57. Id. at xxviii-xxix.
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could not agree on whether they should be treated as public bene-
fit corporations, mutual benefit corporations, or as a separate cate-
gory of religious corporations. After considerable public input, a
majority of the Subcommittee decided that corporations purport-
ing to operate for religious purposes should be treated as "reli-
gious corporations. '58 The Revised Act provides for differential
treatment of these organizations based on societal consensus and
constitutional requirements. 9
These three categories are not intended to represent the es-
sence of nonprofit corporations. They represent only one way, al-
though an important way, of looking at nonprofit corporations.
The categorizations are not based on the essence of the organiza-
tions, but on representations they make to the public, their mem-
bers, and others. If an organization purports to benefit the public,
or to provide services or facilities for the private enjoyment of its
members, or to engage in religious activities, then it is reasonable
to provide rules which are consistent with these representations.
E. Simplicity as a Precondition of Utility
Simplicity is a precondition of utility. For this reason, over
ninety percent of the provisions of the Revised Act treat all non-
profit corporations the same way. This uniform approach is possi-
ble because the formation, operation, restructuring, and dissolu-
tion of nonprofit corporations follow the same general provisions.
For example, nonprofit corporations file articles,"' give notices,61
and qualify to transact business 62 in similar ways, regardless of
the nature of their activities. The special provisions that apply to
only a public benefit,6 3 a mutual benefit,' or a religious corpora-
58. Id. at xxix-xxx. The Attorney General may bring an action to enjoin illegal
activity or to dissolve a corporation violating the public policies or a state or which has
obtained its articles through fraud. See REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT §§ 1.30
and 14.30.
59. See, e.g., id. § 1.80 (religious corporations' constitutional rights); § 6.21 (termi-
nation, expulsion, or suspension); § 7.03 (court ordered meetings); § 8.30 (ability of direc-
tors to rely on religious authorities); § 14.30 (grounds for judicial dissolution); and § 14.32
(receivership or custodianship).
60. See id. §§ i.20-.28 (filing documents); § 2.01 (incorporators); § 2.02 (articles of
incorporation); and § 2.03 (incorporation).
61. See id. § 1.41 (notice); § 5.03 (resignation of registered agent); § 5.04 (service
on corporation); § 7.05 (notice of meeting); and § 7.06 (waiver of notice).
62. See id. ch. 15 (foreign corporations).
63. See id. § 6.11 (b) (transfers); § 6.30(c) (notice to attorney general in derivative
actions); § 8.31(b) (director conflict of interest); § 8.55(d) (notice to attorney general of
1988-89]
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tion 5 comprise less than ten percent of the Revised Act.
As a model act grows in complexity it is less likely to be
adopted, followed, or understood. The California law, unlike the
Revised Act, treats public benefit, 6 mutual benefit,67 and religious
organizations separately. 8 This tripartite treatment adds com-
plexity to and needlessly stresses the differences between nonprofit
corporations. The Revised Act treats the three categories together,
thereby highlighting their similarities.
Skillful but limited application of the "what if" game is cru-
cial in developing a useful model law. Lawyers and particularly
law professors often ask: "What if this? What if that?" They then
provide legal solutions to the possible scenarios developed by these
questions. Unfortunately, this is often done without regard to the
likelihood and consequences of an event occurring.
The overuse of the "what if" game results in a complex law
answering too many questions, so that only a few experts can un-
derstand it. Such laws are not only counterproductive, but, in the
nonprofit area, catastrophic. Generally, the retention of special-
ized legal expertise is an expensive undertaking. Nonprofit corpo-
rations would be forced to divert funds from their substantive ac-
tivities in order to comply with a complex law's provisions. Many
organizations simply would not comply with an overly complex
model nonprofit law, and those that did would do so only at great
economic and organizational expense. 9
A model law should provide general rules and safe harbors,
and answer some common questions in detail. Implementation
should be left to the nonprofit corporations themselves. In most
instances the organizations will find workable and fair solutions.
When all else fails, the courts may intervene.
proposed indemnification); § 11.02 (limitations on mergers of public benefit or religious
corporations); § 12.02 (notice to attorney general on sale of assets); and § 13.01 (prohib-
ited distributions).
64. See id. at § 6.11(a) (transfers); § 8.31(c) (director conflict of interest); and §
13.02 (authorized distributions).
65. See supra note 57.
66. CALIF. CORP. CODE §§ 5110-6910 (West Supp. 1988).
67. Id. §8 7110-8910.
68. Id. §8 9110-9690.
69. These comments are applicable to the vast majority of nonprofit organizations.
There are a few prosperous nonprofit hospitals, educational institutions, churches, charities,
trade associations, and clubs, but even they would be better off spending their funds on
substantive activities.
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"The best is the enemy of the good."70 This is particularly
true when attempting to draft a model law. The law should recog-
nize and facilitate societal consensus, incorporate existing legal
standards, and not attempt to solve every possible problem. It
should apply new concepts only if those concepts are useful and
desirable. On the other hand, incorporating too many new con-
cepts on which there is no general consensus, and on which rea-
sonable people can differ, will preclude the adoption of any model
law. If a model law deviates too far from political and societal
norms, it will become an academic curiosity 1
CONCLUSIONS
The Revised Act:
1) Is based on an empirical analysis of the problems faced by
nonprofit corporations and attempts to provide practical solutions
to those problems;
2) Is relatively simple in structure. This allows for its use by
nonexperts and lay people and makes its universal adoption more
likely; 2
3) Recognizes the unique and diverse nature of nonprofit cor-
porations and allows them to use appropriate structures, proce-
dures, and control mechanisms;
4) Promotes ease of formation and operation while providing
fundamental protection to members and directors;
5) Recognizes that nonprofit corporations hold themselves out
as benefiting the public, benefiting their members, or engaging in
religious activities. Value judgments are applied consistently with
these representations. Individuals may quarrel with these value
judgments, but the structure of the Revised Act allows an ongoing
dialogue that focuses on the proper issues.
70. "Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien." (I1 meglio e l'inimico del bene). VOLTAIRE, 2
DICTIONNAIRE PHILOSOPHiQuE 49 (Lebigre Freres ed. 1834).
71. This approach must not be overdone. Taken to its extreme it would result in a
mediocre law providing no novel solutions but simply incorporating pedestrian ideas on
which there was complete consensus.
72. The Revised Act is structurally similar to the Model Business Corporation Act.
It emulates the law's provisions in regard to administrative filings with state authorities.
This makes it easier for state legislatures to evaluate the nonprofit law, provides less incen-
tive for state bureaucracies to oppose the law, and allows lawyers and others to work with a
familiar set of rules.
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